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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court Of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
§78-2a-3(2)(j), by transfer from the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court has 
original jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code §78-2-2(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue No, 1 - Improper Dismissal of the Bad-Faith Refusal to Settle Counterclaim 
Did Judge Pullan improperly dismiss Unior Shores' counterclaim against Liberty 
Mutual for bad faith refusal to settle in violation of an obligation to act in good faith and 
deal fairly with their insureds under the Liberty Mutual insurance policy issued to the 
Shores (hereinafter the "insurance policy")? 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Phone Directories v. Henderson. 8 P.3d 256 
(Utah 2000). 
Issue No. 2 - Improper Dismissal of Counterclaims for Declaratory Relief 
Did Judge Pullan improperly dismiss Unior Shores' and Burdene Shores' (the 
Shores) claims for declaratory relief by finding as a matter of law, that the Shores' claims 
that the family exclusion (or step down, hereinafter the "step down endorsement") 
provision, limiting the liability of Liberty Mutual to statutory minimums complies with 
Utah law? 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Phone Directories v. Henderson. 200 UT, 8 
1 
P.3d 256 (Utah 2000). 
Issue No, 3 - Improper Granting of Summary Judgment Finding the Liberty Mutual 
Step down endorsement Provision Valid and Enforceable 
Did Judge Pullan improperly grant Liberty Mutual Insurance Company's motion 
for summary judgment on their Declaratory Judgment action finding as a matter of law, 
without allowing appropriate discovery or inquiry into related facts, that the step down 
endorsement was valid and enforceable against the Shores? 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Sittner v. Schriever* 22 P.3d 784, 2001 UT App 
99 (Utah App 2001). Speros v. Fricke. 98 P.3d 28, 2004 UT 69, |20 (Utah 2004). 
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings,.. . and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Issue No, 4 - Improper Denial of Discovery 
Did Judge Pullan improperly deny the appellant's Rule 56(f) motion to allow 
further discovery on issues related to Liberty Mutual's motion for summary judgment and 
motions to dismiss; and, was the trial court's failure and refusal to require Liberty Mutual 
to go forward with discovery proper? 
Standard of Review: either abuse of discretion or correctness, Roundv v. Stalev* 
1999 UT 229 (Utah App 1999). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Burdene Shores and Unior Shores (the Shores) are aged, retired persons in their 
70fs and 80fs. Unior is a WWII veteran who literally fought his way across Europe with 
the United States Army. 
The Shores purchased an automobile insurance policy from Liberty Mutual as a 
result of advertising targeted at retired military personnel. The Shores are co-insureds 
under the insurance policy. 
This case involves a simple automobile accident in which Burdene Shores was 
severely injured. Burdene Shores was a passenger in an automobile driven by her 
husband, Unior Shores. It is alleged that Unior Shores was primarily at fault in the 
accident. 
The accident caused permanent disability to Burdene Shores; and, she incurred 
direct medical and medical related expenses significantly in excess of $25,000. 
As the PIP insurer for Burdene Shores, Liberty Mutual received copies of all direct 
medical expenses and most other medical-related expenses. 
At the time of the accident, the Shores had in force a policy of insurance from 
Liberty Mutual (hereinafter the "insurance policy") with declared policy limits for 
liability of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. The Shores should have been 
adequately insured, including coverage at least sufficient to cover Burdene Shores' 
medical and medical-related expenses for her injuries in the accident. 
Buried within the insurance policy is a conflicting, ambiguous, step down 
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endorsement provision which Liberty Mutual claims limits its liability to Burdene Shores 
under the liability provisions of the insurance policy to $25,000 for the negligence of 
Unior Shores. 
The insurance policy was delivered to the Shores some time after the policy was 
purchased and coverage was bound. 
The step down endorsement and consequent reduced limits of liability for insureds 
is not stated or otherwise mentioned in the policy declarations. No information 
(materials or otherwise) provided by Liberty Mutual to the Shores prior to the Shores' 
receipt of the insurance policy referred to the step down endorsement. The step down 
endorsement was never pointed out to the Shores by Liberty Mutual in any fashion other 
than the delivery of a 46-page insurance policy to the Shores some time after the 
insurance coverage was purchased and after the insurance coverage was bound. The step 
down endorsement was never meaningfully disclosed to the Shores until after a liability 
policy limits claim of $100,000 was made by Burdene Shores. 
Liberty Mutual asserts, and Judge Pullan found as a matter of law, that the 
coverage stated in the step down endorsement liability is the limit of coverage provided to 
the Shores by the policy. This decision was made at a time when Unior Shores had 
before the trial court his answer and counterclaim. Counsel for Unior Shores made 
argument at the summary judgment hearing on Burdene Shore's claims. 
Course of the Proceedings 
The course of proceedings in the trial court is as follows: 
1. Liberty Mutual filed suit for declaratory judgment against Burdene Shores on 
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February 9, 2004, seeking to limit their liability for damages to Burdene Shores to 
$25,000 as a result of the negligence of Unior Shores. 
2. On February 13, 2004 the trial court, on Liberty Mutual's ex parte request, ordered 
the deposit of $25,000 into the court trust fund by Liberty Mutual, to be held pending the 
outcome of this litigation. 
3. On February 26, 2004, pursuant to request of Liberty Mutual, Burdene Shores, as 
the only defendant, waived service of the summons and complaint. 
4. On March 12, 2004 (filed on March 17, 2004), Liberty Mutual filed an amended 
complaint adding Unior Shores as a defendant in their declaratory judgement action. 
5. On March 25, 2004, Burdene Shores served and filed her answer and 
counterclaims against Liberty Mutual. 
6. On May 25, 2004, Burdene Shores moved for a scheduling and management 
conference because of Liberty Mutual's failure and refusal to begin discovery or hold a 
scheduling and management conference as required by Rule 26(f) of the U R C P. 
7. On May 28, 2004, Liberty Mutual filed a motion to dismiss Burdene Shores' bad 
faith counterclaim (Count Two of her Counterclaim). 
8. On June 9, 2004, Unior Shores served on Liberty Mutual his answer and 
counterclaim to Liberty Mutual's action for declaratory judgment. 
9. On June 22, 2004, Judge Lynn Davis, at the request of Liberty Mutual and over the 
objection of the defendants, stayed all discovery until August 9, 2004. 
10. On August 9, 2004, oral argument was held on Liberty Mutual's motion to dismiss 
Burdene Shores' bad faith counterclaim before Judge Derek Pullan. At the hearing, and 
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on August 27, 2004, by written judgment, Judge Pullan dismissed the bad faith 
counterclaim of Burdene Shores. 
11. At the August 9, 2004 hearing, Judge Pullan did not enter a discovery or 
scheduling order as requested by the Shores, but did order that the parties confer to work 
out the outstanding discovery issues. 
12. On September 16, 2005 Liberty Mutual filed a motion for summary judgment on 
its declaratory judgment claims in its complaint; and, for dismissal of the declaratory 
judgment claims of Unior Shores' and Burdene Shores' counterclaims. 
13. On October 4, 2004, Burdene Shores served requests for admission and requests 
for production of documents upon Liberty Mutual. Liberty Mutual responded to the 
requests for admission but failed and refused to respond appropriately to the requests for 
production. 
14. On December 10, 2004 Unior Shores filed and served a motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
15. On December 10, 2004 oral arguments were held on Liberty Mutual's Motion for 
Summary Judgment; and, some arguments were had on Unior Shores' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
16. At the December 10, 2004 hearing, the Shores requested that the court defer its 
decision and allow completion of and additional discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the 
U R C P . 
17. Judge Pullan denied the request to complete and obtain additional discovery; and, 
ruled in favor of Liberty Mutual on the Motion for Summary Judgment and motion to 
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dismiss. The formal judgment was signed January 24, 2005 granting Liberty Mutual's 
motion for summary judgment and dismissing all counterclaims. 
Disposition at the Trial Court 
The trial court failed and refused to enforce the Shores' discovery rights. 
Judge Pullan dismissed Unior and Burdene Shores' bad faith counterclaims. 
Judge Pullan granted Liberty Mutual's Motion for Summary Judgment on Liberty 
Mutual's claims for declaratory relief; and dismissed the Shores' counterclaims for 
declaratory relief against Liberty Mutual on the same issue - the validity of the step down 
endorsement reduced liability limits in Liberty Mutual's insurance policy with the Shores. 
With no evidence and essentially no discovery, Judge Pullan ruled as a matter of law that 
the step down endorsement in Liberty Mutual's insurance policy was valid and 
enforceable. 
Judge Pullan refused to defer summary judgment until after further discovery. He 
refused to require Liberty Mutual to go forward with discovery at the time it should 
initially have gone forward; and, then refused to defer summary judgment to allow 
discovery long after the discovery should have occurred and been properly responded to 
by Liberty Mutual. 
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RELEVANT FACTS 
A review of the transcripts of the hearings which are at issue in this case reveal a 
number of transcription errors. Most of those errors relate to the improper identification 
of the person speaking. It is hoped that these transcription errors will have no impact on 
this appeal. 
The transcripts contain only arguments, no testimony and no evidence. 
Background Facts 
1. The Shores are an elderly, retired couple. Burdene Shores was born on June 17, 
1929, making her 76 years old at this time. Unior Shores was born on November 1, 1921, 
making him 83 years old at this time. Affidavit of Burdene Shores in Opposition to 
Liberty Mutual's Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Affidavit of Burdene 
Shores"), para. 3 and 5. Record on Appeal (hereinafter RoA), pgs. 367 and 368. 
2. Unior Shores is retired from the Army. Affidavit of Burdene Shores, para. 3 and 
5. RoA, pgs. 368 and 367. 
Facts about the Case 
3. In late 2002, the Shores received direct mail solicitations from Liberty Mutual 
advertising the availability of preferred rates of insurance for retired military personnel. 
After receiving several of these solicitations and seeing other advertisements from Liberty 
Mutual for automobile insurance they invited a local insurance agent of Liberty Mutual to 
make a presentation to them. Affidavit of Burdene Shores, para. 3 and 5. RoA, pgs. 368 
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and 367. 
4. Burdene Shores and her husband Unior Shores purchased an automobile insurance 
policy from Liberty Mutual on about January 10, 2003. Affidavit of Burdene Shores, 
para. 3 and 5. RoA, pgs. 368 and 367 
5. The Shores physically received the insurance policy from Liberty Mutual 
sometime after January 16, 2003. Answer and Counterclaim, Exhibit "A", Cover letter . 
RoA, pg. 66. Answer and Counterclaim, Counterclaim, Count One,.para. 9, RoA, pg. 
78. 
6. The purchase occurred as a result of advertising directed at retired military persons 
by Liberty Mutual. Affidavit of Burdene Shores, para. 8 and 9. RoA, page 367. 
7. There were no terms of the insurance policy discussed by Liberty Mutual agents, 
or otherwise disclosed to the Shores prior to the purchase of the insurance policy, except 
that the Shores required the same coverage (including limits of liability) they had under 
their then existing Met Life policy. Affidavit of Burdene Shores, para. 9 through 17. 
RoA, pgs. 368 and 367. 
8. In order to close the sale, the Liberty Mutual salesman assured the Shores they 
would have the same coverage under the Liberty Mutual insurance policy as the Met Life 
policy for which the Liberty Mutual salesman was selling a replacement policy. 
Affidavit of Burdene Shores, para. 10 through 16, RoA, pgs. 367 and 366 
9. On September 9, 2003 the Shores were involved in an automobile accident in 
which Unior Shores was driving a vehicle owned by the Shores which was then insured 
by Liberty Mutual. Amended Complaint, para. 6 and 7. RoA, page 17. Answer and 
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Counterclaim, Counterclaim, Count One, para. 15, RoA, pg. 77. 
10. It is alleged that Unior Shores was primarily at fault in causing the accident. 
Answer and Counterclaim, Counterclaim, Count One, para. 16, RoA, pg. 77. 
11. Burdene Shores was a passenger in the vehicle at the time of the accident, and was 
without fault in the accident. Answer and Counterclaim, Counterclaim, Count One, 
para. 15, RoA, pg. 77. 
12. Burdene Shores incurred severe and substantial medical and medical-related 
expenses as a result of the accident. Answer and Counterclaim, Counterclaim, Count 
One, para. 17, RoA, pg. 77. 
13. Those medical and medical related expenses are substantially in excess of $25,000. 
Answer and Counterclaim, Counterclaim, Count One, para. 18, RoA, pg. 77. 
14. As a result of the accident, Burdene Shores is now severely and permanently 
disabled. Answer and Counterclaim, Counterclaim, Count One, para. 17, RoA, pg. 77. 
15. The Liberty Mutual insurance policy as delivered to the Shores is 46 pages long. 
Answer and Counterclaim, Exhibit "A", RoA, pgs. 66 through 21. 
16. Except for the limits of coverage purchased and rates charged for that coverage 
there was no discussion nor disclosure of the terms of the insurance policy to the Shores 
prior to the issuance of the insurance policy. Answer and Counterclaim, Counterclaim, 
Count One, para. 14, RoA, pg. 77. 
17. The Shores had no input into the drafting or terms of the insurance policy. 
Answer and Counterclaim, Counterclaim, Count One, para. 13, RoA, pg. 77. 
18. Other than the above, the step down endorsement liability limits of the Liberty 
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Mutual insurance policy were never disclosed in any meaningful fashion to the Shores 
until after the insurance policy was purchased by, issued to, and delivered to the Shores; 
and, a claim had been made by Burdene Shores. Answer and Counterclaim, 
Counterclaim, Count One, para. 19, RoA, pg. 77. 
19. The Liberty Mutual insurance policy is a contract of adhesion. 
20. The Liberty Mutual insurance policy contains declarations listing various types of 
coverage and the maximum amounts of those coverages (limits of liability). RoA, pgs. 65 
through 63. 
21. The Liberty Mutual insurance policy at pages 2 and 3 includes the declarations 
pages (RoA, pgs. 65 through 63) which prominently list limits of coverage, including: 
Liability $100,000 per person, $300,000 per accident. 
Uninsured Motorists (Utah Specific) $25,000 per person, $50,000 per accident 
Underinsured Motorists (Utah Specific) $25,000 per person, $50,000 per accident 
Personal Injury Protection (PIP - Utah Specific) $3,000 medical single limit 
22. Nowhere in the insurance policy declarations is there any listing of reduced limits 
of coverage for any persons insured under the Liberty Mutual insurance policy. RoA, 
pgs. 65 through 63 
23. There is a listing of principal rating factors used in establishing rates in the Liberty 
Mutual insurance policy listed at pages 28 and 29. RoA, pgs. 39 and 38. 
24. The differing limit of liability for insureds is not a differing risk within the 
meaning of Utah Code §31a-21-308; and, is not clearly stated as required by Utah Code 
§3 la-21-308. Answer and Counterclaim, Counterclaim Count One, para. 22 through 28, 
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RoA, pgs. 76 and 75. 
25. None of the listed rating factors include any reference to different rates or risks 
based on whether or not a claimant is an insured. Insurance Policy, RoA, pgs. 39 and 
38. 
26. Buried on page 22 of the policy (RoA, pg. 45) is the step down endorsement 
liability limit provision which Liberty Mutual claims limits the liability of Liberty Mutual 
under the insurance policy to $25,000 for any liability claims by Burdene Shores against 
Unior Shores. 
27. The step down endorsement liability limit provision was hidden on page 22 of the 
policy with the intent to hide the provision and prevent the Shores' discovery of the step 
down endorsement and thereby deny them the coverage which they reasonably believed 
they had purchased. Answer and Counterclaim, Counterclaim, Count One, para. 20, 
RoA, pg. 76. 
28. The step down endorsement liability limit for insureds is ambiguous, and not 
phrased in a manner that is understandable by ordinary people, and was so phrased and 
not disclosed in the declarations with the intent to hide the provision from the Shores and 
other similar insureds. Answer and Counterclaim, Counterclaim, Count One, para. 25 
through 27, RoA, pgs. 76 and 75. 
29. If the step down endorsement provision is valid, the Liberty Mutual insurance 
policy is not equivalent in coverage to the Met Life insurance policy of the Shores, which 
the Liberty Mutual insurance policy replaced. 
30. If the step down endorsement liability limit provision is valid, there were false 
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representations made by Liberty Mutual as to the coverage provided when the Liberty 
Mutual agent sold the Liberty Mutual insurance policy to the Shores. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Improper Dismissal of the Bad-Faith Counterclaim 
The summary/signature page of the Liberty Mutual policy by its own terms 
disclaims any language in the step down endorsement which conflicts with the coverage 
provided by the policy. (RoA, pg. 234) This disclaimer must be read and construed as a 
layperson of ordinary intelligence would reasonably construe it. Because the Liberty 
Policy and the declarations repeatedly identify the endorsements as not part being part of 
the policy, they are subject to this express disclaimer. For the same reason, any attempt to 
use the Personal Injury Protection Endorsement to limit the coverage provided by Part B. 
of the policy likewise is ineffective. Under either Part A. of the policy or Part B. of the 
policy, the Shores have coverage for Burdene's medical payments and expenses up to 
$100,000.00. 
Summary Judgment was not Available to Liberty Mutual on its claims for 
Declaratory Relief on the Step Down Edorsement 
The same arguments stated immediately above apply with equal force to Liberty 
Mutual's claims for a declaration that the step down endorsement fully operates and so 
limits coverage for the Shores to $25,000.00. 
Failure to allow appropriate Discovery 
The trial court failed to require Liberty Mutual to properly engage in discovery, 
13 
but allowed it to stall discovery in the case. 
There are substantial factual questions as to Liberty Mutual's marketing practices 
to the Shores and specific false representations to the Shores which Judge Pullan should 
have allowed discovery regarding before ruling on any motion for summary judgment. 
If this court finds the Liberty Mutual step down endorsement valid, the Shores 
should nonetheless be able to inquire into the marketing practices directed at the Shores 
and similar persons, and the false representations of policy provisions made by Liberty 
Mutual to the Shores in the sale of the insurance policy to them. 
ARGUMENT 
A Lay Person's Reading of the Policy 
The step down clause in the Liberty Mutual policy is in Part I of Endorsement PP 
01 93 04 02 (hereafter the step down endorsement), which is attached to the policy and 
referred to on page 2 of the declarations pages. (RoA, pg. 245) Part I of the step down 
endorsement explicitly states that "Part A [of the policy] is amended as follows", thus 
limiting the operation of the step down clause to Part A of the policy, which refers to 
liability coverage. 
The policy summary/signature page is where Bill Shore's wife, Burdene, signed to 
accept the policy. (RoA, pg. 245) This page is the natural starting point in the lay readers 
(in this case Unior Shores - a.k.a. Bill Shores) attempt to understand the policy. On the 
summary/ signature page the word policy is defined as that part of the document referring 
to "specific descriptions, definitions, exclusions, and conditions." No mention is made in 
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that definition of endorsements.1 So by definition, endorsements are not included in the 
policy. The summary/signature page also states that if there is any conflict as to coverage 
between the policy and anything else, the policy controls. 
The cover page of the policy declares in bold letters, "Please read the policy and 
each endorsement carefully." This declaration clearly uses the words policy and 
endorsement as a references to separate types of documents. It does not say "please read 
the policy and each of its included endorsements carefully." By identifying endorsements 
as separate documents, this bold statement on the cover page of the policy confirms the 
lay readers reading of the statement in the first paragraph of the summary/ signature page: 
that endorsements are documents which are separate from the policy. As well, at the end 
of the policy, the officers of Liberty Mutual have signed their names. 
As the lay reader progresses through the policy, he discovers that the definitions 
section of the policy does not define the word endorsement. Nor does it define issue or 
amendatory. Review of Part A of the policy discloses language about limits of liability 
and refers the lay reader to the declarations page. Paging over to the declarations pages 
of the policy he discovers halfway down the first page of the page the heading "PART". 
Immediately under this is a section for "A. LIABILITY" which recites that there is 
$100,000.00 per person liability coverage and $300,000.00 per accident total liability 
coverage. This is the coverage Bill and Burdene had on their former policy and what they 
told the insurance agent they wanted on this policy. 
!The word endorsement only appears on the cover page of the policy, in paragraph A of 
Part F on page 11 of the policy, and in paragraph C.2 of Part F on the same page - which refers 
to amendatory endorsements. 
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Paging back to Part B. of the policy the lay reader reviews the coverage for 
medical payments. In the limits of liability section for Part B. Medical Payments, the 
reader is again directed to the declarations page for the limits of that coverage. But unlike 
the very clear and distinct matching heading on the first page of the declarations page for 
Part A. liability coverage in the policy, there is no corresponding reference in the 
declarations pages to Part B. Medical Payments. This creates an ambiguity. 
As the declaration pages are further perused the lay reader discovers a reference to 
Personal Injury Protection. Under that heading is a reference to medical expenses with 
coverage of $3,000.00. But in that same section of the declarations page it also recites 
coverage for Work Loss - Essential Services and Loss of Income Benefits - without 
stating any coverage amount. Also included in same space on the declarations pages are 
$1,500.00 of Funeral Expenses and $3,000.00 survivors loss benefits. 
This raises many questions for the lay reader. What is Personal Injury Protection? 
It is not defined in the definitions section of the policy and there is no reference to it in 
Part B. of the policy. There is a reference to medical expenses in Part B of the policy but 
no reference to work loss, essential services, funeral expenses or survivors loss. Are 
these all part of Personal Injury Protection? Does the $3,000.00 coverage refer to both 
Medical Expense and Work Loss - Essential Services? If so, where in the policy is 
Personal Injury Protection and doesn't this coverage limit apply only if there is also a 
loss of work and essential services? Referring again to the summary page of the policy, 
the lay reader discovers that if there is a conflict between the policy and anything else, the 
policy controls. 
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Paging back to Part B. of the policy the lay reader again reviews the limits of 
liability section. (RoA, pg. 264) It states that no one will be entitled to receive duplicate 
payments under Part A and C of the policy. Because the declarations page clearly refers 
to coverage for part A and C (and also Part D) of the policy, but not part B, the lay reader 
concludes that coverage for part B in the policy, depending on whether or not there is an 
uninsured motorist in the accident, must be that coverage stated in the declarations page 
for Part A or C of the policy. 
Continuing his review of the policy, the lay reader finally gets to Part F. Here for 
the first time endorsements are addressed. Part F.A. states that the policy terms can only 
be changed by endorsements issued by Liberty Mutual. Part F.C. informs the lay reader 
of the purpose of amendatory endorsements. It refers to changes which broaden coverage 
in the policy and also refers to changes made through a "general program revision." In 
any event, this language indicates that unlike an exclusion from coverage, an endorsement 
will generally increase coverage. 
Paging forward again to the summary/signature page the lay reader again reads the 
statement that if there is any conflict between the coverage stated in the policy and 
anything else, the policy will control. The lay reader concludes that an endorsement can 
change the policy but not conflict with the coverage provided by the policy. He observes 
that the declarations pages are themselves an endorsement to the policy and that this is the 
only endorsement which is specifically referenced in the policy. However, it does not 
contain the headline, like some of the other endorsements, that "THIS ENDORSEMENT 
CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY." The declarations pages 
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simply provide more detail on coverages stated in other part of the policy and also 
attaches to the policy additional endorsements. 
The fact that these additional endorsements are stated to be attached to the policy 
but are not stated to be included in or referred to as part of the policy, is entirely 
consistent with the definition of policy given in the summary/signature page and with the 
reference on the cover page to endorsements as documents separate from the policy. This 
again confirms to the lay reader that endorsements are not part of the policy and that if 
there is any conflict between the coverage stated in the policy and the endorsements, the 
policy controls. 
The next endorsement is for personal injury protection. At the very top of this 
endorsement it states "THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE 
READ IT CAREFULLY." This answers the lay readers earlier questions. It is apparent 
that Personal Injury Protection is an additional coverage that is separate from the Part B. 
Medical Payments coverage in the policy. Because there is no reference in the Personal 
Injury Protection endorsement to Part B. in the policy, the lay reader concludes that the 
coverage in Part B. of the policy is unaffected. 
This also confirms the lay readers earlier conclusion that the coverage in Part B is 
in the amounts stated for Parts A. or C. on the declarations pages. The lay reader is now 
confident that he has coverage under Part B. of the policy for the amounts stated in Part 
A. or Part C. on the declarations page. In the unlikely event there is a conflict, Liberty 
Mutual has affirmatively declared on the summary/signature page that the coverage stated 
in the policy will control. 
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After taking a nap or two or three, a walk and having something to eat, the lay 
reader soldiers on through the labyrinthian language of the Liberty Mutual policy. 
Finally, he gets to the step down endorsement. Like the Personal Injury Protection 
endorsement it has the headline "THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. 
PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY." Apparently, this endorsement also provides 
supplemental coverage. But it also creates an ambiguity. Part F.A. of the policy refers to 
endorsements generally. Apparently, two endorsements (the declarations endorsement 
and the step down endorsement) apply to part A. But only the declarations endorsement 
is referred to specifically by Part A. of the policy. 
By this time having pulled on the oars of policy interpretation until his intellect is 
about to break, a lay reader will plow through this step down endorsement only if he is 
very curious or something of an eccentric. The terms single limit and split limit are terms 
of art specific to the insurance industry. A lay reader would not know what these terms 
mean. They are not defined in the policy definition, not used in part A of the policy, 
nowhere found in Title 31A of the Utah Code and not included in Websters New 
Universal Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language (published 1996). A plain 
reading of the policy (and the statute and the dictionary) discloses to the lay reader that a 
split limit and a single limit - whatever they are - are not part of Part A of the policy. 
But whatever a split and single limit are and however they operate in conjunction 
with Part A of the policy, ultimately, the lay reader again takes comfort in the fact that if 
there is a conflict between Part A of the policy (which does not refer to a single limit or 
split limit, but does state that it provides coverage for bodily injury in the $100,000.00 per 
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person stated in the declarations endorsement), and the step down endorsement (which 
recites that it does provide coverage under Part A, but only in the event that there is single 
limit or split limit coverage) the coverage stated in Part A of the policy, which 
specifically references only the declarations endorsement, controls. 
Stated another way, if there is a conflict between the coverage in Part A and the 
step down endorsement, the summary/signature page signed by Burdene states that "In 
case of any conflict, your policy language will control the resolution of coverage 
questions". And through careful reading of the policy the lay reader has confirmed that in 
two other places in the policy (the cover page and the declarations pages) the policy and 
endorsements attached to it are stated to be separate documents. 
In that case, the lay reader concludes that in the unlikely event that the step down 
endorsement conflicts with Part A. in the policy because the endorsement addresses 
subjects not found in Part A. of the policy: split limit and single limit; the summary/ 
signature page (which is the plainest English the lay reader can find anywhere in the 
policy) states that the policy's explicit reference to the declarations endorsement controls 
over the step down endorsement. So although the step down endorsement might change 
some terms in Part A. in the policy, it cannot diminish the liability coverage provided by 
Part A., and in particular its particular preference for the declarations endorsement. In the 
lay persons experience, the specific controls over the general. 
The Policy Ambiguities Must Be Construed Against Liberty Mutual 
The above analysis demonstrates how a reader might reasonably resolve 
ambiguities in the Liberty Mutual policy. That analysis turns on the summary/signature 
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page. When presented with a summary of coverage on a page such as this, the natural 
tendency of the lay reader is to read and rely upon the statements there. This is especially 
so because the language on that summary page is in plain English. 
Using that summary/signature page as the natural starting point for review of the 
policy, when the lay reader starts to read the policy he is confronted with a number of 
ambiguities. What are endorsements? What do they do? What is an amendatory 
endorsement? How does is differ from a plain vanilla endorsement? What is a split limit? 
What is single limit? If the step down endorsement refers to split limit and single limit 
and Part A does not, is there a conflict between the step down endorsement and Part A? 
If a policy part refers to one endorsement specifically, and another not at all, does the 
specific control over the general? 
The lay reader, confronted with a prolix, cross-referenced, abstruse, common sense 
confounding document, will not attempt to resolve every last ambiguity in the policy. He 
will only mentally process the policy and its endorsements long enough to determine 
whether it provides the coverage the insurance agent told him its provides. So if the lay 
reader determines that the step down endorsement either refers to additional coverage or 
to diminished coverage that will only apply if the term split limit or single limit is used in 
Part A. of the policy, and that in any event if there are coverage conflicts with Part A of 
the policy and an endorsement specifically referenced by that part; the lay reader will 
know at that point that the policy controls over the un-referenced endorsement and he will 
never need to find out what a split limit or a single limit is. 
In his mind, he has answered enough questions to determine that he has what the 
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insurance agent told him he has. 
The hallmark of this Liberty Mutual policy is question begging drafting. The 
burden of such drafting should not fall on the insurance consumer but on the scrivener of 
the boiler plate laden policy. § 237 of the Restatement, Second, Contracts on 
standardized agreements, addresses such drafting: 
(l)Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement signs 
or otherwise manifests assent to a writing and has reason to know that like 
writings are regularly used to embody terms of agreements of the same 
type, he adopts the writing as an integrated agreement with respect to the 
terms included in the writing,... 
(3) Where the other party has reason to know that the party manifesting 
such assent believes or assumes that the writing does not contain a 
particular term, the term is not part of the agreement. 
The supreme court has ruled that ambiguous, adhesive insurance contracts are to be read 
by applying the same reading - contra proferentem - that a lay person would employ in 
reading that potentially unconscionable adhesive contract. See Farmers Ins. Exchange v. 
Versaw, 2004 WL 1878215, (Utah Aug 24, 2004) where the court stated: 
*^f 8 To communicate its terms with adequate clarity, a contract of insurance 
must use language and grammar capable of understanding by a reasonable 
insurance purchaser. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Sandt 854 P.2d 519, 521-22 
(Utah 1993). We have formulated the test for insurance contract clarity this 
way: 
11
 Would the meaning [of the language of the insurance 
contract] be plain to a person of ordinary intelligence and 
understanding, viewing the matter fairly and reasonably, in 
accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the words, 
and in the light of existing circumstances, including the 
purpose of the policy [?]" 
LPS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988) (quoting 
Auto Lease Co. v. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co.. 7 Utah 2d 336, 339, 325 P.2d 264, 
266 (Utah 1958)). 
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This is especially true when the summary/signature page specifically recited that 
the policy consisted of "descriptions, definitions, exclusions, and conditions" but then 
omitted any reference to endorsements to the policy. Instead, the summary/signature 
page recited that in "case of any conflicts, your policy language will control the 
resolution of coverage questions." [emphasis added] Of course, this can only mean 
conflicts between the policy and anything else.2 Here, the anything else was the step 
down endorsement. 
Having created an ambiguity which a lay person could reasonably resolve (and in 
fact, most probably would resolve) in favor of the limits of liability for Part A. stated on 
the declarations page and the limits of liability for Part B. stated for Part A. or Part C. on 
the declarations page, the public policy of this state requires resolution of that ambiguity 
in favor of the insured. How can the step down endorsement at issue here be "fully set 
forth in the policy", when the summary/signature page, the cover page and the 
declarations pages all state that endorsements are documents which are separate from the 
policy? 
By its own adhesive boilerplate terms, Liberty Mutual has contracted to nullify the 
endorsements which conflict with its policy. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-106(1) 
where the legislature prohibited incorporation into an insurance policy of any agreement 
or provision that is not fully set forth in the policy; the rationale being that an insured 
2Except of course representations from the agent. The summary page specifically 
informs the insured lay person that they must rely on their agents representations as to the 
policies terms and conditions, thus attempting to sidestep the requirements of Utah Code Ann. 
31A-21-105 that statements and representations as to policy coverage must be specifically stated 
in the policy. 
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should not be bound by policy provisions which he does not have full and opportunity to 
examine and understand at the time the policy is delivered to him. 
Liberty Mutual might argue that the insureds in this case had full opportunity to 
examine and understand the conflicting endorsements because they were attached to the 
policy and that is all that § 106(1) requires. But that is not all that is required. It also 
requires that the policy accurately reflect the terms of the incorporated agreement, 
provision, or attached document. Here, Liberty Mutual has by contract stipulated with the 
insureds that any endorsements which conflicts with the coverage stated in Part A. of the 
policy, does not accurately state the coverage in the policy. In effect, with the language 
in the summary/signature page, Liberty Mutual has contracted to nullify the family 
exclusion clause in the step down endorsement attached to the Shores' policy. 
Did Liberty Mutual have reason to know that a lay reader reviewing the summary/ 
signature page could reasonably conclude that they must rely on their insurance agent's 
representations as to policy coverage? Did Liberty Mutual have reason to know that there 
was a Utah statute which explicitly dealt with that question?3 
If a plain reading of the language in the first paragraph in the summary/signature 
page is adopted, the inevitable answer is yes. 
Did Liberty Mutual have reason to know of the appellate decisions in this state 
which require that any ambiguity in the policy be construed in favor of coverage? Did 
Liberty Mutual have reason to know that a lay reader could reasonably construe the 
statement in the summary/signature page so that in any conflicts as to coverage, the policy 
3See Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-105(l)(a) 
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would trump any conflicting language elsewhere? 
If one adopts a plain reading of the statement on the cover page of the policy 
"Please read your policy and each endorsement carefully" and of the statement in 
endorsement 01 to the policy (the declarations page), that the endorsements were attached 
to the policy (thus unequivocally stating that the policy and the endorsements were 
separate documents) the answer to each of these questions is a resounding yes. Then, on 
the very last page of the policy, which is the summary/signature page, it again defines 
policy by excluding endorsements. And in the next sentence it declares that conflicts as 
to coverage between that policy and the endorsements are to be controlled by coverage 
declared in the policy. 
With the above in mind, under the test stated by §237(3) of the Restatement, 
Liberty Mutual had reason to know, and know, and know again that in manifesting their 
assent to the policy the Shores believed or assumed that this writing did not contain a 
particular term stepping down the liability coverage in Part A. of the policy. 
Accordingly, that term is not part of the agreement. 
Front and back, back and front, Liberty Mutual leads - and in fact, compels - the 
lay reader to conclude that the coverage declared in Part A of the policy will control over 
that stated in the step down endorsement. In aggravation, Liberty Mutual uses terms of 
art such as single limit and split limit without defining those terms. It speaks of 
amendatory endorsements which broaden coverage and general revisions which both 
broaden and restrict. Having created a multitude of ambiguities which directly confuse 
the lay reader as to liability coverage, Liberty Mutual now seeks to enforce the policy to 
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the very letter. 
Of such ambiguities the Versaw court at f 9 stated: 
This test is supplemented by our observation that ambiguities typically 
appear in two forms: 
"An ambiguity in a contract may arise (1) because of vague or 
ambiguous language in a particular provision or (2) because 
two or more contract provisions, when read together, give rise 
to different or inconsistent meanings, even though each 
provision is clear when read alone.' Sandt, 854 P.2d at 523. 
Both types of ambiguity infect the terms of Farmersfs E-Z 
Reader Car Policy relating to the coverage for loss of 
consortium." 
In Cullum v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 857 P.2d 922 (Utah 1993) the supreme 
court refused to incorporate by reference a step down clause limiting coverage for an 
insured. There the clause was in the policy itself, not in any attached document. See 
Cullum at 925 where the court condemns the policies incorporation of "coverage limits 
from an outside source without fully setting them forth in the contract." If Liberty Mutual 
wished to incorporate the step down endorsement in its policy, it merely needed to amend 
a few key phrases in its policy and place on the last page of the policy, in large bold type, 
a recitation that the endorsements referenced in the policy declarations and attached to the 
policy were part of the policy. 
Cullum cites Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985) for 
the rule that a policy must disclose in writing the existence of an exclusion. Obviously, 
where that exclusion is stated in an attachment to the policy, the policy must make clear 
that the attachment is part of the policy. As the above analysis from a lay person's 
perspective makes clear, Liberty Mutual never made that disclosure and instead 
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affirmatively represented by its own policy terms that those attachments, at least as to 
conflicting coverage, were not part of the policy. Because of this, the holding in Cullum 
has full application to this case: 
"In light of the plain language of section 31A-21-106, the important nature of the 
omitted material, and the ease with which the insurer could have set forth the actual limits 
of coverage, we hold that the limitation provision in this policy violates section 31A-21-
06 and is unenforceable." 
That the holding in Cullum also controls in cases of ambiguity in disclosure of a 
policy term is confirmed by Versaw at f 24 : 
Although we construe insurance contracts using the same interpretive tools 
we use to review contracts generally, we have frequently declared that 
because insurance policies are adhesion contracts, they are to be " 
'construed liberally in favor of the insured and their beneficiaries so as to 
promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance.1" Sandt 854 P.2d at 521 
(quoting Richards v. Standard Accident Ins. Co.. 58 Utah 622, 200 P. 1017, 
1020 (1921)). In Sandt, we summarized our jurisprudence on adhesion 
contracts, specifically insurance contracts, recognizing our long-standing 
view that because insurance contracts are typically drafted by insurance 
company attorneys, are not negotiated by the insured, and are offered on a 
take-it-or- leave-it basis," 'this jurisdiction, like many others, has declared 
in favor of a liberal construction in favor of the insured to accomplish the 
purpose for which the insurance was taken out and for which the premium 
was paid.'ff Id. at 522 (quoting Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 94 
Utah 532, 562, 72 P.2d 1060, 1073 (1937) (Larson, J., concurring)). 
*6 [7] ]f 25 We have also stated that ambiguous or uncertain language in an 
insurance contract that is fairly susceptible to different interpretations 
should be construed in favor of coverage .... [I] fan insurance contract has 
inconsistent provisions, one which can be construed against coverage and 
one which can be construed in favor of coverage, the contract should be 
construed in favor of coverage. Id. at 522-23. The reason for doing so is 
clear: "Because insurance policies are intended for sale to the public, the 
language of an insurance contract must be interpreted and construed as an 
ordinary purchaser of insurance would understand it." Id. at 523. 
As to Part B. of the policy, the medical payments coverage, the above analysis 
discloses a plain reading of the policy by a lay person would require him to conclude that 
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the Personal Injury Protection endorsement recites supplemental coverage, which because 
of the stipulation in the summary/signature page that in "case of any conflicts, your 
policy language will control the resolution of coverage questions" [emphasis added], 
this renders moot any conflicting coverage in the Personal Injury Protection endorsement. 
But Liberty Mutual seeks to impose a standard for interpretation of its policy 
which requires sufficient skill, cunning, subtlety, complexity, casuistry and sophistication 
to make even a hearse horse snicker. In other words, it wants the policy read with the 
same art by which it was devised. The appellate courts of this state require a plain reading 
at the level of a lay reader of ordinary intelligence. If a lay reading is applied to this 
policy, then at the least the Shore's have coverage under Part A or Part B of the policy, 
unamended by the step down endorsement. 
Parol Evidence Is Relevant To The Shores' claims 
The specific language on the summary/signature page of the policy and the 
ambiguities in the policy and its attachments bring into issue §235 of the Restatement, 
Second, Contracts which reads: 
(1) An integrated agreement is a writing or writings constituting a final 
expression of one or more terms of an agreement. 
(2) Whether there is an integrated agreement is to be determined by the 
court as a question of preliminary to determination of a question of 
interpretation or application of the parol evidence rule. 
(3) Where the parties reduce an agreement to a writing which in view of its 
completeness and specificity reasonably appears to be an integrated 
agreement, it is taken as an integrated agreement unless it is established by 
other evidence that the writing did not constitute a final expression. 
When read in light of Liberty Mutual policy's own explicit language identifying on three 
different occasions that the endorsements are documents separate from the policy and 
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given the express language in the summary/signature page that favors coverage in any 
resolution of conflicts between the policy and endorsements, it is evident that the Liberty 
Mutual policy step down endorsement was not integrated into the policy. 
Fact issues arising from statements made or not made by agents for Liberty Mutual 
are then properly discoverable. And of course in determining whether the policy and its 
endorsements present an integrated agreement, parol evidence is always admissible. 
Union Bank v. Swenson. 707 P.2d 663, 664 (Utah 1985). Furthermore, the numerous 
ambiguities in the Liberty Mutual policy invokes an independent ground for the 
consideration of parol evidence. Fitzgerald v. Corbett 793 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah 1990). 
On the above authority, the district court in denying all discovery to the Shores and 
in imposing summary judgment when disputed issues of material fact remained entirely 
unresolved, erred. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Unior Shores' Bad-Faith Counterclaim against Liberty Mutual Should be Allowed 
to go Forward 
Bill Shores' bad-faith counterclaim was dismissed by the trial court. Where that 
bad-faith counterclaim was based on the first party contractual relationship of Bill Shores 
to Liberty Mutual and where the policy affirmatively declares that the coverage in the 
policy must trump conflicting endorsements, Mr. Shores is entitled to full discovery on 
the issue of bad faith. 
Liberty Mutual's insistence that step down endorsement negates any claim of bad 
faith by Mr. Shores, is rebutted by the express terms of its own policy. Without the 
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benefit of the step down endorsement or the Personal Injury Protection limitations on 
medical payments, conduct such as Liberty Mutual followed in this case constitutes unfair 
claims settlement practice. 
It is requested that the trial court's dismissal of Burdene Shores' bad-faith 
counterclaim be reversed, the bad-faith counterclaim be reinstated and allowed to proceed 
to discovery and as appropriate, to trial 
The Summary Judgment for Liberty Mutual and Dismissal of the Shores' 
Counterclaims Should be Reversed and the Case Allowed to Go to Trial 
For the reasons recited above, it is requested that the Liberty Mutual step down 
endorsement be found invalid and unenforceable against the Shores because of the terms 
in Liberty Mutual's own policy negating any conflict between the coverage stated in Part 
A. or Part B. of the policy and any endorsement to either of those parts. 
If the Liberty Mutual step down endorsement is generally found to be valid, it is 
requested that the case be allowed to proceed to trial on the factual issues surrounding the 
representations which induced the Shores to purchase the insurance policy, to determine 
whether the step down endorsement was integrated into the policy. 
In that case, it is requested that the Shores also be allowed to move forward on 
their counterclaims for declaratory relief against Liberty Mutual. 
The Shores should be allowed appropriate Discovery before Dispositive Rulings by 
the Court 
The trial court improperly allowed Liberty Mutual to stall discovery in this case; 
and, improperly refused to allow further discovery before ruling on Liberty Mutual's 
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motion for summary judgment and dismissal of the Shores' declaratory judgment claims. 
The summary judgment and dismissal should be reversed and remanded for further 
discovery before ruling on a fact-dependant motion which Liberty Mutual might present. 
Additionally, the Shores should be allowed to complete discovery to determine if 
other theories need to be advanced in support of their counterclaims including 
reformation of contract, misrepresentation and fraud. 
Bill Shores is entitled to attorney's fees on this appeal 
Our appellate courts have repeatedly held that claims by insureds for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing constitute a narrow exception to the 
American Rule. Pugh v. North American Warranty Services. Inc., 2000 Ut App 121, ^ 14. 
Bill Shores in the action below has plead such a breach by Liberty Mutual and has 
claimed for attorney fees. In the result, if Mr. Shores prevails on this appeal he is entitled 
to his attorney fees and he requests that the court make an award of reasonable attorney 
fees to him. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of August, 2005. 
RONALB-ADY 
Attorney for Unior Shores 
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ADDENDUM: 
A. Answer and Counterclaim of Unior Shores date June 9, 2004. 
B. Documents Contained in Appellant Burdene Shores Addendum: 
1. Order and Final Judgment of Judge Pullan dated January 21, 2005 6 
2. Liberty Mutual Insurance Policy in the form delivered to the Shores dated 
January 16, 2003 16 
3. Amended Complaint by Liberty Mutual dated March 12, 2004 61 
4. Affidavit of Burdene Shores in Opposition to Liberty Mutual's Motion for 
Summary Judgment dated December 2, 2004 84 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing "Brief of The 
Appellant Unior Shores" was mailed by the United States Postal Service on the 22nd day 
of August, 2005 to the following: 
Mitchel T. Rice 
Joseph E. Minnock 
Morgan, Minnock, Rice & James, L.C. 
136 S Main St, 8th Fir 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Liberty Mutual Insurance Company 
R^hatdAdy^ 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
BURDENE SHORES and UNIOR SHORES 
Defendants. 
UNIOR SHORES 
Counterclaim Plaintiff, 
v. 
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY and LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
ANSWER & COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. 040400497 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
Defendant Unior Shores through his counsel Ronald Ady, answers the complaint of Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Company as follows: 
ANSWER 
First Defense 
Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Second Defense 
1. The allegations of paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 are admitted. 
2. Mr. Shores denies that the insurance policy in question properly includes the policy 
provision referred to in paragraph 8 of Plaintiff s complaint. As to the verbatim terms of the policy 
Plaintiff asserts is the policy that was properly issued to Mr. Shores, Mr. Shores is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of said allegations and therefore 
denies the same. 
3. Mr. Shores denies that endorsement to the insurance policy in question referred to in 
paragraph 9 of Plaintiff s complaint, was ever brought to his attention or was ever properly included 
in his policy with Plaintiff. As to the verbatim language and typeface of that endorsement, Mr. 
Shores is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of said 
allegations and therefore denies the same. 
4. With respect to the allegations of paragraph 1,3 and 11, Mr. Shores is without knowledge 
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of said allegations and therefore denies the 
same. 
5. The allegations in paragraph 13 of Plaintiff s complaint are denied. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
Factual Background 
1. The Accident. On or about September 9, 2003, Mr. Shores was driving his motor vehicle 
insured by the policy complained of by Plaintiff in this action and was involved in an accident with 
another motor vehicle. Burdene Shores, a passenger in Mr. Shores's vehicle, received serious and 
permanently debilitating injuries in that accident. 
2. Burdene Shores has claimed that Unior Shores was primarily responsible for that accident 
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and that she has incurred medical expenses and damages above $100,000.00 in that accident. 
3. The Policy. In January 2003 Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual) or Liberty 
Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual) issued to Mr. Shores and his wife Burdene Shores 
the Liberty Guard Auto Policy, No. A02-268-209010-103 7 (referred to in this Complaint as "the 
policy"). The policy period was January 12,2003 to January 12,2004. At all times relevant to this 
civil action, Mr. Shores and his wife Burdene were insureds under that policy. 
4. The policy provided in part that Liberty Mutual would pay on Mr. Shores behalf all sums 
that Mr. Shores became legally obligated to pay as damages because of personal injury or property 
damage arising out of ownership or operation of a motor vehicle. The policy was delivered to Mr. 
Shores on or after January 16, 2003. The policy generally limited Liberty Mutual's liability under 
the policy to $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. At all times relevant to Mr. Shores 
claims in this action Liberty Mutual affirmatively represented to Mr. Shores that the liability limits 
and coverage provided by the policy would be at least those of the Met Life policy the Liberty 
Mutual policy replaced. 
5. Other than the liability limits in the policy and the classes of coverage provided, Mr. Shores 
had no opportunity to negotiate the terms of the policy with Liberty Mutual. The policy was a pre-
printed form the terms of which Liberty Mutual would not negotiate with consurmers like Mr. 
Shores. Mr. Shores relied upon the specific advice and representations of Liberty Mutual as to the 
content, coverage and exclusions provided by that policy. 
6. In particular, Liberty Mutual made representations as to the liability coverage of the policy 
in comparison to the former automobile policy Mr. Shores had subscribed to through Liberty Mutual 
and it was upon the specific representation of Liberty Mutual that the policy provided the same 
coverage as the Met Life policy, that Mr. Shores agreed to subscribe to the policy with Liberty 
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Mutual. 
7. Mr. Shores reliance on Liberty Mutual's representations as to coverage provided under the 
policy was made necessary by the abstruse drafting and arcane construction of the policy, which 
included general insuring clauses limited by carefully drafted and lengthy definitions of specific 
terms, exclusions to the general insuring clauses and exceptions to the exclusions. This arcane 
constructions and the lack of plain English drafting in the policy made it problematic for an 
unsophisticated lay person of average intelligence, education and experience to understand the terms 
of the policy. 
8. In particular, the limitation on coverage relied upon by Liberty Mutual in its action for 
declaratory judgment is located on page 22 of the policy, is not readily referable to the other liability 
coverage provisions of the policy and in fact requires very careful reading and above average 
comprehension skills to properly understand. Furthermore, the limitation on page 22 of the policy 
is not stated on page 2 of the policy declarations. The general liability limit stated on the 
declarations page is $100,000.00 per person and $300,000.00 per accident. 
9. Prima facie, the policy in form and content is drafted so that the unsophisticated reader of 
average intelligence, education and experience is left with the impression of the policy providing 
broad and general liability coverage, while making the limitations in question obscure or 
indiscernible to such readers. Because of this, not only was the policy a contract of adhesion but it 
also failed to comply with the express requirements of Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-308(1), which 
imposes a special duty on Liberty Mutual to disclose the limitations of the at issue in this case by 
using plain English drafting. 
10. Liberty Mutual breached that duty by not making the required disclosure of those limitations 
on page 22 to Mr. Shores, which breach constituted constructive fraud by Liberty Mutual thus 
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depriving Mr. Shores of the $100,000 in policy coverage for Burden Shores claims to which he was 
entitled. 
11. Further and in the alternative, at all times relevant to Mr. Shores's claims in this civil action, 
Liberty Mutual knew or should have known of these readily apparent defects in the policy's form 
stated above. 
I. Fraud 
1. By reason of the matters plead above, at all times relevant to Mr. Shores's claims and 
defenses in this pleading, until January 2003, Met Life was the insurer that underwrote insurance 
coverage on Mr. Shores's motor vehicle. Under the terms of that coverage Mr. Shores had liability 
coverage limits of $100,000.00 per person. 
2. On or about January 12, 2003 and Liberty Mutual substituted its insurance policy 
coverage on Mr. Shores's motor vehicle for that of Met Life. 
3. On information and belief, at the time Liberty Mutual substituted its insurance coverage 
on Mr. Shores's automobile for that of Met Life, Liberty Mutual knew or should have known that 
the liability coverage stated in Liberty Mutual's policy issued to Mr. Shores provided substantially 
less liability coverage to Mr. Shores on the coverage which is the subject matter of Liberty Mutual's 
complaint in this action, than the coverage provided under the policy from Met Life. 
4. At no time prior to the injuries to Burdene Shores which are at issue in this action did 
Liberty Mutual disclose to Mr. Shores that there had been a reduction in coverage by Liberty Mutual 
in relation to that previously provided to Mr. Shores by Met Life. 
5. At all times relevant to Liberty Mutual's claims against Mr. Shores in this action, Liberty 
Mutual had an affirmative duty to disclose this reduced coverage to Mr. Shores. 
6. By reason of Liberty Mutuals failure to disclose that reduced coverage to Mr. Shores, it 
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has constructively defrauded Mr. Shores of the coverage for which Mr. Shores contracted with 
Liberty Mutual. 
II. Mutual Mistake 
Further and in the alternative, by reason of the matters plead above, Liberty Mutual and Mr. 
Shores were mutually mistaken as to the liability coverage terms contained in the policy, and more 
particularly, those terms complained of by Liberty Mutual in this action and Mr. Shores is entitled 
to reformation of the policy to reflect the terms contracted for which the parties contracted. 
III. Negligent Misrepresentation 
Further and in the alternative, by reason of the matters plead above, Liberty Mutual 
negligently misrepresented the policy coverage provided to Mr. Shores. 
IV. Estoppel 
Further and in the alternative, by reason of the matters plead above, Liberty Mutual is 
estopped from from denying that it is obligated to indemnify Mr. Shores for Burdene Shores claims 
up to $100,000.00. 
V. Waiver 
Further and in the alternative, by reason of the matters plead above, the representations of 
Liberty Mutual to Mr. Shores have resulted in the waiver by Liberty Mutual of its right to assert the 
reduced policy coverage claimed by it in this action. 
VI. Failure of Consideration 
At no time did Mr. Shores pay or agree to pay premiums for the reduced coverage asserted 
by Liberty Mutual in this action, but at all times Mr. Shores has paid premiums for the full coverage 
asserted in paragraph 4 in the factual background stated above. In the result, Liberty Mutual has 
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failed to provide any consideration to Mr. Shores for the reduced coverage claimed by Liberty 
Mutual in this action. 
VII. Illegality — unauthorized form 
Further and in the alternative, the policy endorsement asserted by Liberty Mutual seeks to 
impose a household exclusion contrary to public policy of this state and so is not an authorized form 
authorized pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-201, rendering the policy exclusion asserted by 
Liberty Mutual illegal. 
VIII. Illegality — unfair claims settlement practices 
Further and in the alternative, Liberty Mutual in asserting the policy endorsement relied upon 
by it in this action seeks to engage in claim settlement practices prohibited by Utah Code Ann. 
§31A-26-301 and 303 and the regulations promulgated pursuant to those statutes, thus rendering 
Liberty Mutual's claims illegal. 
IX. Illegality — breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
Further and in the alternative,, by reason of the matters plead above, in asserting the policy 
endorsement relied upon by Liberty Mutual in this action, it seeks to breach its implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing with Mr. Shores or to breach its statutory duty to defend Mr. Shores, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-203, in good faith in the claims made by Burdene Shore 
against Mr. Shores, thus rendering Liberty Mutual's claim for declaratory judgment illegal. 
X. Illegality — statutory coverage 
Further and in the alternative, Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-303(1 )(a)(iii) explicitly requires that 
Liberty Mutual provide liability coverage to Mr. Shores in claims made against him that are the 
same as the coverage provided to Burdene Shores, and subsection (B) to that statutory coverage 
requirement specifically prohibits reduction of coverage by Liberty Mutual because Mr. Shores may 
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be at fault in causing an accident, there being no limitation in the statutory language on the parties 
claiming against Mr. Shores because of such "an accident". By reason of these express statutory 
prohibitions against reduced coverage, Liberty Mutual's claims against Mr. Shores in this action are 
rendered illegal. 
XI. Illegality — discrimination 
Further and in the alternative, Utah Code Ann. §31 A-23-302(3)(a) prohibits Liberty Mutual 
from discriminating between policyholders by imposing different terms of coverage on 
policyholders subject to third party liability claims, where those different terms of coverage are 
based on classifications unrelated to the nature and degree of risk covered or expense borne by an 
insurer under that coverage. On information and belief, at all times related to Liberty Mutual's 
claims in this action, it incurred no additional risk and bore no additional expense in providing the 
same liability coverage to insureds claimed against by family members as that provided to insureds 
for liability claims made by third parties unrelated to them. Accordingly, Liberty Mutual's claims 
in this action are violative of this section of the Utah Code and so illegal. 
XII. Illegality — unfair and deceptive practice 
Further and in the alternative, Liberty Mutual, by reason of the matters plead above, through 
the representations of Liberty Mutual to Mr. Shores as to the coverage in dispute in this action, has 
engaged in unfair or deceptive acts of the kind prohibited by Utah Code Ann. §13-11-4(1) and 
(2)(a)(b)(d)(e)(f)(j)(q) or (r). 
XIII. Illegality - clear statement of loss limitation 
Further and in the alternative, Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-308(1) requires that limitations on 
the loss borne by Liberty Mutual must be stated in the policy with clear language. Furthermore, the 
different limitations for each risk must be clearly stated. Liberty Mutual in the language used to 
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describe the limitation on coverage asserted by it in this action has failed to comply with this 
requirement. In particular, and without limiting the generality of the foregoing defense, the language 
employed by Liberty Mutual has made it practically impossible for an unsophisticated lay person 
of average education and experience to reasonably reconcile or reasonably determine whether 
Liberty Mutual's policy language is consistent with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-
303(l)(a)(iii) or Utah Code Ann. §31A-23-302(3)(a) and (8). 
XIV. Laches 
Further and in the alternative, Liberty Mutual knew or should have known through its agent, 
Liberty Mutual, that Mr. Shores had applied for and was relying upon Liberty Mutual issuing a 
policy of insurance in conformance with the coverage provided by Mr. Shores's prior policy 
obtained through Liberty Mutual. Despite that imputed knowledge, Liberty Mutual failed to take 
timely steps or any steps at all to advise Mr. Shores that the policy issued by Liberty Mutual did not 
conform to that relied upon by Mr. Shores. By reason of that untimely delay, it would be inequitable 
to enforce the policy limitations complained of by Liberty Mutual against Mr. Shores. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Mr. Shores for cause of action against Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and Liberty 
Mutual Fire Insurance Company, alleges as follows: 
Parties 
1. Mr. Shores is an individual. 
2. Mr. Shores Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual) is a corporation 
engaged in the business of insurance. 
3. Mr. Shores Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual) is a corporation engaged 
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in the business of insurance. 
Jurisdiction and Venue 
4. Counterclaim Plaintiff Unior Shores is a citizen of the State of Utah and reside in the County 
of Utah and this court has jurisdiction of this counterclaim under Utah Code Ann. §78-33-1. 
Venue for this counterclaim properly lies in Utah County. 
5. Liberty Mutual is a corporation incorporated under the laws of other than Utah and has its 
principal place of business in a State other than the State of Utah. Its principal office within 
this state is in the County of Salt Lake. 
6. Mr. Shores incorporates by reference in this counterclaim the facts plead above in his 
Affirmative Defenses. 
First Cause of Action 
(Bad Faith) 
As a cause of action against defendant Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., Mr. Shores further 
allege as follows: 
7. Mr. Shores incorporate in this paragraph the allegations set forth in paragraphs through 1 
through 6 above as if they were set forth in full in this paragraph. 
8. In responding to Burdene Shores's settlement offer defendant Liberty Mutual in bad faith 
failed to give as much consideration to Mr. Shores's interests in settling Burdene Shores's 
claims against Mr. Shores as it gave to its own interest in contesting those claims, in that: 
a. Liberty Mutual failed to investigate the case against Mr. Shores honestly and 
competently and to determine the likely outcome of Burdene Shores's claims and the fair settlement 
value of her claim. 
b. Liberty Mutual failed to inform Mr. Shores of defendant Liberty Mutuals evaluation 
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of Burdene Shores's case against him. By failing to keep Mr. Shores informed, Liberty Mutual 
deprived Mr. Shores of the opportunity to take steps to protect his interests. 
e. Liberty Mutual failed to accept Burdene Shores's settlement offer, despite the fact that, 
given Mr. Shores's exposure to liability and Burdene Shores's damages, which exceed $100,000.00, 
an insurer in Liberty Mutuals position with policy limits exceeding the amount of Burdene Shores's 
claim would have accepted her policy limits settlement offer to protect its own interests. 
9. As a proximate result of defendant Liberty Mutual bad faith, Mr. Shores has been forced to 
engage in needless litigation and the accompanying stress, worry and continuing focus on 
the cause of Burdene Shores injuries, on the financial stress accompanying the care of those 
injuries and on the costs of future care of those injuries. 
10. Liberty Mutual's Oppression, Constructive Fraud, and Malice. In doing the acts described 
in this Complaint, Liberty Mutual, knowing that they would cause financial injury to Mr. 
Shores, rejected Burdene Shores's settlement offer and in doing so subjected Mr. Shores to 
unjust hardship in conscious disregard of his rights to an expeditious and fair resolution of 
Burdene Shores claims against him, and made misrepresentations to Mr. Shores and 
concealed material facts from Mr. Shores with the intention of depriving him of the 
insurance protection to which he was entitled. Defendant Liberty Mutual officers and 
managing agents knew of Liberty Mutual's misconduct and accepted the benefits of that 
misconduct, doing nothing to rectify that misconduct, and thereby ratified that wrongdoing. 
11. On Mr. Shores' first cause of action Mr. Shores prays for damages against defendant Liberty 
Mutual: 
A. For a declaration that Liberty Mutual must indemnify Mr. Shores on Burdene Shores 
claims against Mr. Shores up to $100,000.00; 
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B. For reformation of the policy to the policy limits agreed to by the parties of $ 100,000.00. 
C . For punitive damages in favor of Mr. Shores in the amount of $750,000.00; 
D. For attorneys' fees and costs in favor of Unior Shores, according to proof, 
E. For such further relief as the Court may deem just. 
Second Cause of Action 
(Unfair Claim Settlement Practices) 
As a cause of action against Liberty Mutual, Mr. Shores further allege as follows: 
12. Mr. Shores incorporate in this paragraph the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 10 
as if they were set forth in full in this paragraph. 
13. Liberty Mutual is engaged in the business of insurance in the State of Utah, and the policy 
was issued and delivered to Mr. Shores in the State of Utah. 
14. Liberty Mutual committed the acts referred to above knowingly and as part of a general 
business practice of: 
a. knowingly misrepresenting the contents of insurance policies; 
failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to 
claims arising under insurance policies; 
b. failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation of 
claims; 
c. refusing to pay claims without first conducting a reasonable investigation based upon 
all available information; 
d. not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of 
claims in which liability has become reasonably clear. 
15. These acts constitute violations of Utah Code Ann. §31A26-303 and the regulations 
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promulgated pursuant to it. Although this section does not provide a private cause of action 
to Mr. Shores for its breach, it does provide a standard by which the legality of Liberty 
Mutual's claim settlement practices can and should be assessed in relation to Mr. Shores 
claims for common law cause of action for unfair claims settlement practices sounding in 
tort or contract. 
16. As a result of Liberty Mutual's violations, Mr. Shores suffered harm as alleged in paragraph 
10. 
On Mr. Shores's second cause of action Mr. Shores pray for damages against Liberty Mutual 
as follows: 
A. For a declaration that Liberty Mutual must indemnify Mr. Shores on Burdene Shores 
claims against Mr. Shores up to $100,000.00; 
B. For reformation of the policy to the policy limits agreed to by the parties of $100,000.00. 
C. For punitive damages in favor of Mr. Shores in the amount of $750,000.00; 
D. For attorneys' fees and costs in favor of Unior Shores, according to proof, 
E. For such further relief as the Court may deem just. 
DATED June 9, 2004. 
By: 
RONALD ADY 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing "Answer and Counterclaim was 
mailed by first class mail, postage prepaid, on June 10, 2004 to the following: 
Mitchel T. Rice 
Joseph E. Minnock 
Morgan, Minnock, Rice & James, L.C. 
136 S Main St, 8th Fir 
Salt Lake City, Ut, 84111 
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